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Introduction
The past six years have seen unprecedented swings in the price
of oil.  ‘Dated Brent’ crude oil prices rose steadily between the
middle of 2003 and the end of 2007, before the pace of
increase picked up sharply in the first half of 2008 (Chart 1).
By July 2008, prices had risen by more than 50% in nominal
terms over a six-month period, but they then collapsed, ending
2008 no higher than they had been at the end of 2004.  
There has been no shortage of interest in, and explanations for,
the remarkable rise and fall in oil prices.  Most commentators
agree that part of the increase over the five years to the start
of 2008 was due to rapid demand growth from fast-growing
emerging economies.(2) But there are substantial differences
of opinion about the relative importance of other factors, with
some stressing shocks to fundamentals and others focusing
more on the role of speculative activity and asset price
bubbles.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the main explanations
that have been put forward.  It discusses explanations that
stress demand and supply shocks with those that emphasise
the role of speculative activity in the oil market and considers
whether conclusions reached about the 2003–07 period also
hold for 2008.  Although the underlying factors considered
here are also relevant in analysing the behaviour of oil prices in
2009,(3) the focus of this analysis is the five-year period up
until the end of 2008.
The paper is organised as follows.  The next section reviews the
predictions of economic theory about the prices of exhaustible
commodities, such as oil.  The article then considers whether
The price of oil rose steadily between the middle of 2003 and the end of 2007, rose further and
more rapidly until mid-2008 and fell sharply until the end of that year.  Commentators agree that a
significant part of the increase in the oil price over that period was due to rapid demand growth
from emerging markets, but there are substantial differences of view about the relative importance
of other factors, and limited work thus far in explaining the large fall in oil prices in the second half
of 2008.  The purpose of this article is to analyse the main explanations for the rise and fall in oil
prices in the five years until the end of 2008.  It argues that shocks to oil demand and supply,
coupled with the institutional factors of the oil market, are qualitatively consistent with the
direction of price movements, although the magnitude of the rise and subsequent fall during 2008
is more difficult to justify.  The available empirical evidence suggests that financial flows into oil
markets have not been an important factor over the period as a whole.  Nonetheless, one cannot
rule out the possibility that some part of the sharp rise and fall in the oil price in 2008 might have
had some of the characteristics of an asset price bubble.
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shocks to demand and supply are consistent with the
behaviour of oil prices since 2003 and follows with an
assessment of the role of asset price bubbles and speculative
flows.  The final section concludes.
Economic theory and oil price dynamics
Oil has two key characteristics that differentiate it from other
goods.  First, it can be stored away.  Second, it is exhaustible.
Both of these characteristics have important implications for
oil price dynamics.
Storability
The seminal paper on the effect of storability on commodity
price behaviour is Working (1949).  Market participants can
purchase a futures contract which promises to deliver one
barrel of oil in the following period.  Alternatively, they can buy
a barrel of oil in the spot market in the current period, and
exploit its storability by holding it as inventory.  They will then
incur the costs of storage and forego the interest from not
saving the money in a bank.  The benefit they get in return is a
‘convenience yield’, which is the flow of services gained by
holding the oil rather than a futures contract.  There is always a
risk that a futures contract will not be able to deliver the
physical oil when needed.  Large users of oil prefer to hold it
rather than a promise of it in the future (oil refineries cannot
produce petrol using financial contracts).  This means that the
futures price of oil for delivery one period ahead can be written
as:
(1)
where ft is the futures price, st is the spot price, sct is the
storage cost, cyt is the convenience yield and it is the
one-period rate of interest.
It follows that the level of inventories market participants hold
in the oil market will in part reflect the exploitation of all
profitable deviations between futures prices and spot prices by
drawing down or building up inventory.  At the same time, the
level of oil inventories will also reflect ‘fundamentals’ as
market participants will respond to shocks to the net balance
of oil demand and supply by changing their inventories.  For
example, in response to a positive but temporary demand
shock oil refineries might draw down their inventories, which
in turn will smooth the spot price response to the shock.  By
contrast, a permanent demand shock would lead them to
increase their desired level of inventories, and hence the spot
price and the futures price will rise. 
Exhaustibility
The seminal paper on the impact of exhaustibility on oil price
dynamics is Hotelling (1931).  Hotelling’s main insight was that
for a planned path of oil extraction to be optimal, producers
must be indifferent between selling an additional barrel of oil
in one period and investing the proceeds at the prevailing
market rate of interest or waiting and extracting the barrel in
the following period.  Otherwise producers would benefit from
moving resource extraction between periods.  It follows that
the price of the exhaustible resource net of marginal extraction
costs (‘net price’) should be expected to increase at the rate of
interest between one period and the next.  This condition is
known as Hotelling’s rule, and it produces a path for the
expected net oil price (Hotelling’s path).  This path will be
consistent with an expected path for future demand.  A
different path for future expected demand will produce
different paths for net prices (still increasing at the rate of
interest but from a different level).
The empirical applicability of Hotelling’s rule has often been
limited.  One reason for this is that it applies to the price net of
costs rather than the actual price paid in the market.  And each
expected path for the net price can be consistent with a variety
of expected paths for actual prices, depending on what is
expected to happen to marginal extraction costs.  Second,
shocks to demand and supply will cause the expected net price
to move between different Hotelling paths over time.  It
follows that in order to analyse oil price movements in the
post-2003 period, it is necessary to identify the demand and
supply shocks that may have moved prices on to different
Hotelling paths.
Shocks to demand and supply
This section considers whether unexpected changes in demand
and supply can explain the fluctuations in oil prices between
2003 and 2008.  In doing so, the analysis relies on official
estimates of demand and supply and their revisions by the US
Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International
Energy Agency (IEA) over a two-year horizon.  In interpreting
this analysis, it is useful to bear in mind that although the EIA
and IEA estimates are widely monitored by market
participants, they are not necessarily the market’s view.
Moreover, prices today will be affected by the market’s view
about the balance between demand and supply well beyond
two years.
This article attempts to assess whether the direction of price
movements was in accordance with the news about net
demand.  But it does not attempt to measure the scale of the
effects of news on net demand on the oil price.  To do so one
would need to estimate a model of oil prices that performs
well in terms of out-of-sample forecasting and, crucially,
allows for the identification of demand and supply shocks.
Given the relatively poor forecasting success of existing efforts
(see the box on page 217), this article does not seek to
estimate such a model.
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Oil demand
Over 2003–07 growth in final demand for oil averaged 2.0%
per year (Chart 2), 0.8 percentage points faster than during
the preceding five years, and 1.2 percentage points faster than
its average since 1980.  And around 90% of demand growth
during this period came from non-OECD economies.  Indeed,
OECD demand has been falling year on year since the end of
2005.
A significant proportion of this increase in oil demand was
unexpected.  Between 2002 and 2005, the six month ahead
forecast of oil demand from the IEA was on average 2% lower
than the eventual outturn (Chart 3), and the same was true for
other reputable forecasters.  Moreover, more than two thirds
can be accounted for by underestimation of the strength of
demand from non-OECD Asia and the Middle East.
One reason for this underestimation was errors in expectations
of income growth.  The IMF forecasts of GDP growth in
non-OECD Asia, for example, were repeatedly revised upwards
over 2003–05:  calendar-year growth turned out on average
1.6 percentage points stronger than anticipated a year earlier.
And oil demand in these regions seems to be particularly
sensitive to income growth.  Income elasticities of demand(1)
for non-OECD countries are at least double those for OECD
countries.  These estimates, which are outlined in the box on
page 218, suggest that, between 2002 and 2007, income
growth in non-OECD countries generated 5.2 million barrels
Modelling oil prices — a brief review of the
literature
The vast literature on modelling oil prices can be broadly
grouped into two classes.  The first includes futures prices and
often interest rates, storage costs and measures of the
convenience yield as explanatory variables so as to capture
arbitrage opportunities between spot and futures markets.
Some authors (eg Longo, Manera, Markandya and Scarpa
(2007) and Zeng and Swanson (1998)) have found that
forecasts from such models outperform those from simple
time-series benchmarks, such as autoregressive or random
walk models.  But these results are far from unanimous and, in
any case, spot and futures prices are jointly determined by
current and expected demand and supply.  As such, it is
difficult to identify demand and supply shocks in these models. 
The second class of models estimates oil prices as a function of
oil market fundamentals.  Such models can be set up as a
vector autoregression (VAR) (eg Kilian (2008)), but typically
tend to be single reduced-form equations, and explain oil
prices in terms of proxies for demand, supply and extraction
costs.  But oil prices respond to both current and prospective
demand and supply.  And this implies two minimum
requirements for such models to identify demand and supply
shocks.  First, they must include forward-looking explanatory
variables.  And second, explanatory variables should be 
that component of changes in fundamentals that comes as
news to the market.  That is, given that oil prices behave like
asset prices, it is not strong demand growth, but
stronger-than-expected demand growth that should push
prices up.  Data constraints, especially at higher frequencies,
make it difficult to estimate such models. 
Given these limitations, perhaps it is unsurprising that even
when models of this type compare favourably to time-series
benchmarks in terms of estimation, they do not have a similar
advantage when it comes to forecasting (Dées, Gasteuil,
Kaufmann and Mann (2008) and Longo et al (2007)).  Longo
etal (2007) find that forecasting power is greatly improved if
financial variables such as futures prices are also included to
form ‘mixed models’.  But, as explained above, the inclusion of
financial variables limits the usefulness of a model for judging
whether price changes have been consistent with
fundamentals.  And, in any case, it is not possible to attribute
price movements to demand or supply news, when
unexpected changes are not isolated in the estimation process.
An alternative method used to explain price movements is to
combine estimates of the price and income elasticities of oil
demand and the price elasticity of supply with actual growth
rates in income and oil market fundamentals to back out an
implied path for prices.  But the ability of such models to
capture year-on-year variation in prices is poor (eg OECD
(2008)).  Again, this is likely to be related to the omission of
expectations of future supply and demand, which also means
that such models fail to identify demand and supply shocks.
For this reason, there is no attempt to invert the model of oil
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Source:  International Energy AgencyOil Market Report, January 2009.
Chart 2 Final oil demand
(1) Income elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of demand, in this case the
demand for oil, to a change in income.  Similarly, price elasticity of demand measures
the reaction of demand to a change in price.218 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
Income and price elasticities of oil demand
This box summarises estimates of income and price elasticities
of oil demand, from both external sources and a new model
estimated at the Bank.  The income elasticity of oil demand
measures the responsiveness of oil demand to changes in
income and the price elasticity of oil demand measures how
changes in the oil price affects oil demand.  Available external
estimates tend to report two data points for oil demand
elasticities — the ‘short run’ and the ‘long run’ — but rarely the
full time path of the demand response.  The approach
presented here — a dynamic panel method — allows for a
progressive build-up of effects over time.  The model is
estimated for over 100 countries divided into five regions
(advanced economies, developing Asia, oil-exporter countries,
Latin America and rest of the world) over 1984–2004.  Oil
consumption per capita is regressed against one lag of itself,
current GDP per capita and the real price of oil (instead of the
preferred, but not widely available, domestic fuel price).  All
variables are included in logs, and income per capita is
expressed in dollars using market rates.
The results are shown in Charts A and B.  Long-run elasticities
are higher (by between two and five times depending on the
region) than short-run elasticities, and income elasticities are
bigger than price elasticities (at least double, and for some
regions substantially more).  These results are broadly in line
with external estimates (Tables 1 and 2).  Oil demand in
less-developed countries tends to respond much more
strongly to rising income relative to the advanced economies
(Chart B):  developing Asia and oil exporters’ long-run income
elasticity is double the income elasticity of advanced
countries.  As shown in Chart A, the price elasticity for oil
exporters is positive;  this may reflect the fact that an increase
in crude oil prices translates into higher export revenues, in
turn boosting demand, although this result is not statistically
significant.  In practice, the sensitivity of oil demand to
changes in the international price of crude oil may be unstable,
because price changes in the international oil market are not
always immediately passed through to domestic retail prices
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Chart B Estimated income elasticity of oil demand
Table 1 IEA price and income elasticity of oil demand
Advanced Developing Oil Latin Rest of 
economies Asia exporters America the world
Price elasticity
Short run -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.03
Long run -0.12 -0.11 -0.25 -0.21 -0.28
Income elasticity
Short run 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.09
Long run 0.22 0.49 0.39 0.73 0.94
Note:  Based on annual data from 1979 to 2005.
Source:  IEA World Energy Outlook, 2006.
Table 2 Bank price and income elasticity of oil demand
Advanced Developing Oil Latin Rest of 
economies Asia exporters America the world
Price elasticity
Short run -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.11 -0.05
Long run -0.12 -0.13 0.04 -0.24 -0.06
Income elasticity
Short run 0.05 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.13
Long run 0.27 0.56 0.50 0.33 0.16
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per day (mbd) of additional oil demand, while income growth
added only 1.8mbd in developed economies.
Estimates of price elasticities of demand, also outlined in the
box on page 218, suggest that the rising price of oil should
have limited demand increases by more than was seen in the
data.  Two reasons can explain the muted response of demand
to rising oil prices.  First, the extensive use of oil price subsidies
in non-OECD countries has dampened substitution effects,
keeping oil demand higher than it otherwise would have
been.(1) Second, the fact that the transportation sector
represents a higher share of oil consumption in advanced
economies today than it has over the period when price
elasticities were estimated, might have limited the effect of
increasing prices on demand.(2) The ability to substitute oil for
other fuels is both more limited and more gradual in the
transport sector than in any other oil-consuming sector.(3)
Oil supply
As documented above, growth in final demand for oil picked
up during 2003 and 2004.  This initial increase in demand was
largely met by increases in OPEC production.  In early 2002,
OPEC had spare capacity equivalent to around 8% of global oil
demand (Chart 4) and was therefore in a position to increase
output with relatively little delay.  And, indeed, between the
end of 2002 and mid-2005, OPEC increased quotas by 6.3mbd
(29%).
Since 2005, however, total annual oil production growth
averaged less than 1%, down from 3.3% over the preceding
two and a half years (Chart 5).  Indeed, by mid-2005 OPEC
had little remaining spare capacity, with only 1.5mbd available
to it.  Also, non-OPEC production actually declined in 2007 by
2%.
This lower non-OPEC production growth appears to have been
largely unexpected, with the international agencies revising
down their forecasts for production year after year.  In its
predictions for 2005–07, the IEA, for example, revised down its
forecast for annual non-OPEC oil production by an average of
2.4% between its first published forecast and the final outturn
(Chart 6).
The response of production to rising oil prices was surprisingly
muted.  It is possible to point to a number of reasons why.  The
1990s and early 2000s were years of relatively low returns on
capacity investment in the oil industry and, because prices
were expected to stay low, there was little prospect of returns
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(a) Difference between oil demand outturns and forecasts made six months before the start of
that year, where possible.  For the period 1996–2001, some forecasts are four or five months
ahead only. 
Chart 3 Six month ahead oil demand forecast errors(a)
(1) A recent study by the IMF (2008b) suggests that one quarter of low and
middle-income countries failed to pass through even one half of the price increase in
gasoline, diesel and kerosene to domestic consumers between end-2003 and
end-2007.
(2) For example, the share of the transportation sector in total oil consumption in the
United States has increased from 56% in 1980 to 63% in the mid-1980s and to 70%
in the late 2000s.
(3) Cabinet Office (2008) also highlight the increasing share of transport fuels as one
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Chart 5 Annual crude oil production growth220 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
depletion of much spare capacity.  Moreover, the subsequent
need for investment meant that any supply response to
increased demand would be constrained by the industry’s
lengthy lags from investment to production.
That is not to say that investment did not take place:  between
2003 and 2006, nominal capital expenditure in oil exploration
increased by 70% (Chart 7).(1) But a large proportion of this
investment went towards covering escalating industry costs.(2)
As Chart 7 shows, when nominal investment expenditure is
deflated by an appropriate sectoral cost index, it shows that
real investment increased by relatively little.  And much of that
gross investment is likely to have been absorbed by the need
to maintain production in existing fields rather than adding
new capacity.  The IEA (2008) projects that half of global
energy investment over the next 25 years will be devoted to
maintaining the current level of supply capacity.
Marginal costs per barrel are typically much lower for OPEC
than non-OPEC, but restrictions on, and disincentives against
investment by foreign oil companies in OPEC countries,
coupled with geopolitical instability, have prevented net
marginal returns from being equalised globally.  This has
resulted in less efficient levels of production.
To sum up, until 2005, what increase there was in the growth
rate of total oil production was accounted for by OPEC running
down much of its existing spare capacity.  Thereafter, total oil
production growth did not keep pace with the rise in total
demand, with non-OPEC production outturns repeatedly
surprising on the downside.
Oil market balance
Bringing demand and supply factors together paints a picture
of increasing tightness in the crude oil market from the second
half of 2003 onwards.  The market moved from a position in
which demand could only be met by depleting OPEC spare
capacity, to one in which there was excess demand (Chart 8).
This picture is starker if OPEC production is stripped out,
making it clear that supply growth was maintained by using up
existing capacity rather than expanding that capacity — with
an unambiguous increase in market tightness over the whole
period (Chart 9).
Moreover, the extent of this tightness was unexpected, with
adverse surprises about both demand and supply.  Chart 10
plots how the implied expectation of oil market balance in










Months ahead of forecast-year end
Million barrels per day
0
Source:  International Energy Agency Oil Market Report, several years.
(a) IEA forecasts have been adjusted so as to not be distorted by countries leaving or joining
OPEC within a particular year.
Chart 6 Evolution of IEA non-OPEC oil production
forecasts for particular years(a)
(1) Defined as total investment by 53 national and international oil companies,
IMF (2008a).
(2) Production costs increased as higher demand for offshore drilling met with a limited
supply of deep-water rigs;  higher prices for metals and other raw materials also put
pressure on costs — indeed The Economist metals index, a measure of metals prices,
more than tripled over 2003–07.  And a limited supply of graduates and an ageing














(a) Real investment is nominal capital investment in exploration deflated by the US oil cost
producer price index (weighted average of oil and gas wells drilling services, operational
support services, and oil and gas fields’ machinery and equipment indices).
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Sources:  Energy Information Administration and Bank calculations.
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rising profile indicates that the market turned out to be tighter
than forecasters had been expecting.  In the first three years,
there was seemingly little news about increases in oil market
tightness, though as discussed this was largely the result of
OPEC raising quotas.  But 2006 and 2007 did indeed turn out
significantly tighter than forecasters had been anticipating
previously.
The analysis therefore suggests that shocks to oil demand
growth, coupled with the surprisingly inelastic response of
supply to higher prices, are directionally consistent with the
increase in oil prices over 2003–07.
Demand and supply during 2008
Whereas oil prices increased steadily over 2003–07, 2008 was
characterised by a particularly sharp rise in prices followed by
an even sharper fall.  The nominal price of dated Brent crude oil
increased by 49% in the first half of 2008, reaching a peak
above $145 per barrel in early July (Chart 1).  But by the end of
2008 it had fallen back by about 70% to $42 per barrel, 57%
down on its price at the beginning of 2008.  Is it possible to
identify news to current and prospective demand and supply
that might be consistent with these remarkable movements in
prices?
Consensus forecasts for GDP growth in the advanced
economies in 2009 declined throughout 2008, and much
more rapidly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September (Chart 11).  However, for much of the year,
expectations of growth in non-OECD countries held up well.
Reflecting this, IEA and EIA forecasts for non-OECD oil demand
over 2008–09 remained robust.  This resilience in non-OECD
consumption meant that overall IEA demand forecasts for
2008 were only 1.2% lower in June than they had been at the
beginning of the year, despite a revision of -2.2% for the
OECD.
Over the second half of the year, however, prospects for
income growth across the world, and in emerging markets in
particular, deteriorated markedly.  This led the IEA to lower its
projections for global oil demand by 1.2% for 2008 and by
1.6% for 2009.
Taken together therefore, the news on demand is consistent
with falling prices in the second half of 2008, but they do not
provide much support for the rapid rise in prices in the first
half of the year, nor do they explain why the fall in prices
began inJuly.
On supply, as had been the case during much of 2006 and
2007, non-OPEC production continued to weaken during 2008
(ending the year 1% below where it started), and forecasts for
non-OPEC supply continued to be revised down throughout
the year (Chart 12).  Moreover, once prices began to fall in
mid-2008, OPEC took action to cut back on its production
quite swiftly, with a cumulative cut in quotas of 13% of OPEC
production or just under 6% of total world supply — the
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Chart 11 Consensus forecasts for GDP growth in 2009222 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
So the downside news on supply continued to be material
throughout 2008.  But, once demand and supply expectations
are brought together, it turns out that revisions to views on
supply were of the same order of magnitude as revisions to
demand (Chart 13).  In other words, expectations about the oil
market balance made in 2008 have not proven to be overly
pessimistic.
Based on news about the balance of demand and supply in
2008, therefore, it seems that one can justify neither the rise
in prices in the first half of 2008, nor the fall in prices in the
second half.
But one further observation is worth making.  As in 2003–04,
the rebalancing of demand and supply during 2008 was
brought about by shifts in OPEC spare capacity.  Indeed, spare
capacity reached a record low during the spring of 2008,
before rising again in the autumn as demand started to
deteriorate.  Market participants could have been concerned in
the first half of the year about the ability of OPEC to act as a
buffer against further upward pressure on prices.  And they
could have been sceptical in the second half of the year about
OPEC’s ability to enforce new quota levels.  This could have
contributed to the sharp rise in oil prices during the first half of
2008 and the rapid fall during the second half.
Speculative flows and asset price bubbles
The analysis so far suggests that it is difficult to be fully
confident about whether the evolution of oil prices since the
beginning of 2003 is entirely consistent with news about
demand and supply.  This section asks whether other factors
could have played an important role.
Some commentators have suggested that the remarkable
increase and fall in the oil price in 2008 was due to an asset
price bubble which originated at the time that the mortgage
price bubble burst in the United States (Caballero, Farhi and
Gourinchas (2008)).  Others have suggested that financial
flows into the futures market from investors who do not use
oil futures to hedge their consumption or production plans
(so-called ‘speculative’ flows) have pushed prices above the
level warranted by the current and projected balance of supply
and demand (eg Masters (2008)).  These commentators point
to the dramatic increase in financial flows into the futures
market since 2006 (see the evolution of non-commercial net
long positions, a proxy of speculative financial flows, in
Chart 14).  If they are right, some part of the fall in oil prices
since July last year may reflect an unwinding of this
overvaluation.  This section looks at how plausible such
arguments are both theoretically and in light of the available
data.
Asset price bubbles
Broadly speaking, economists have identified two reasons for
asset price bubble creation — ‘irrational exuberance’ and
rational expectations of price movements not warranted by
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Chart 12 Non-OPEC supply forecasts made in 2008
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The proponents of the irrational exuberance argument
(Shiller (2005, 2008)) describe asset price bubbles as the
result of a simple feedback mechanism.  In the first phase,
asset prices start to rise, say due to a temporary demand or
supply shock.  The success of some market participants
attracts public attention that fuels interest in the rest of the
market (and not necessarily limited to financial investors).
Less sophisticated investors enter the market and bid up
prices, causing further enthusiasm based on the extrapolation
of recent price movements far into the future.  At some point,
pessimism can take hold and cause the process to reverse.  This
theory depends on the assumption that a significant number
of investors behave irrationally, an assumption that
mainstream economic theory has tried to eschew in the past.  
By contrast, rational bubble models do not require market
participants to behave irrationally.  One such model, with an
application to the oil market, has recently been put forward by
Caballero et al (2008).  The authors argue that there has been
a fundamental scarcity of investment assets across the globe
— with only a few countries, such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, having the ability to produce ‘good assets’,
attracting large flows from countries with excess savings, such
as China and the Middle East.  They argue that these capital
flows led to low real interest rates in asset-producing
countries, accompanied by the development of an asset price
bubble in non-storable assets such as US mortgage securities.  
This bubble burst in August 2007 when unexpected losses on
these assets revealed that they were riskier than investors had
thought.  In the first phase of the ensuing crisis, the bursting of
this bubble exacerbated the global asset shortage and led
investors to increase rapidly their demand for other sound and
liquid financial instruments.  The combination of low real
interest rates and existing spot market tightness made oil a
desirable destination for funds.  And so, in essence, the
argument is that the bubble relocated from the US mortgage
market to the oil market.  Eventually, when it became clear
that the outlook for the world economy, and therefore oil
market fundamentals, was much weaker than had been
thought, the oil price bubble burst.  
Although theoretically elegant, this account does not explain
the timing of the asset price bubble expanding and then
bursting.  As Chart 1 shows, there is no visible change in the
rate of increase in oil prices in the immediate aftermath of the
sub-prime shock in August 2007.  Moreover, as discussed
above, the point at which expectations about global economic
prospects really began to deteriorate was in September 2008,
whereas oil prices started falling in July.
Can ‘speculative’ flows move prices away from
fundamentals?  
Investors who trade in the futures markets for speculative
purposes tend to avoid taking costly delivery of the physical
commodity — they instead either settle their futures contracts
for cash, or sell them before they expire.  For example,
between 2003 and May 2008 only around 2% of West Texas
Intermediate oil futures contracts on the New York Mercantile
Exchange resulted in physical delivery (Interagency Task Force
on Commodity Markets (2008)).  This means that speculative
position-taking in the futures market can only impact spot oil
prices significantly if it affects spot market participants’
expectations of future spot prices.  And if spot market
participants are rational, this requires that financial flows are
thought to contain new information on the prospective
balance of demand and supply. 
In practice, spot traders are not capable of distinguishing
perfectly the proportion of financial flows originating from
investors with new information about fundamentals from the
proportion that comes from uninformed ‘noise’ traders (eg
passive investors taking positions for portfolio allocation
reasons or for liquidity purposes).  So over short horizons —
limited by the lags before publicly available information on
demand and supply dispels this uncertainty — the activity of
‘noise’ traders can cause spot traders to update their beliefs
regarding fundamentals.  And it is therefore possible for them
to cause spot prices to diverge, for a limited time, from the
level warranted by prospective market tightness.(1) The
August 2008 Inflation Report, for example, suggested that
while purely speculative activity might have sometimes
amplified oil price movements in the short term, sustained
price changes had tended to reflect market fundamentals.
The best publicly available data on financial flows into and out
of commodity markets are from the US Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC).  The data disaggregate positions
by investor type.  Specifically, investors are reported as
‘commercial’ if they are primarily involved in the market to
hedge their main business activity, which typically involves the
production or consumption of oil.  Otherwise, they are
‘non-commercial’.
The net long non-commercial (NLNC) position can be used as
a proxy measure of speculative financial flows (Chart 14).  To
assess whether these flows cause movements in oil prices,
VARs are estimated that relate price changes in one-month,
three-month and one-year futures contracts to changes in
NLNC positions.(2) The model is estimated over two samples:
(1) There are a number of theoretical models in the market microstructure literature that
demonstrate how imperfect information about the composition of aggregate order
flow between ‘informed’ orders and ‘uninformed’ orders can cause temporary
deviations of financial prices away from fundamentals (O’Hara (1995) and Lyons
(2001)).  Recent research has emphasised that the proportion of trades from investors
trading on the basis of news on fundamentals (fundamentalists) in a market responds
endogenously to the perceived misalignment of prices relative to their warranted
levels (Redrado, Bastourre, Carrera and Ibarlucia (2008) and Reitz and Slopek (2008)).
In these models, the confidence with which fundamentalists can predict the direction
of future price movements is increasing in the extent of this misalignment, limiting
further the extent through which deviations from warranted levels can persist. 
(2) Details of the VARs are available upon request.  The number of VAR lags is decided
using information criteria.  Alternative VARs are estimated as robustness checks using
different sample lengths in addition to those reported in the main text.224 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
2003–06 and 2006 to mid-November 2008, in order to
investigate whether the importance of these flows changed
over the period considered.  In neither sample is there support
for the hypothesis that financial flows occur before changes in
prices, evidence — albeit limited — that financial flows do not
cause prices to change.  These results are entirely consistent
with those of other studies including a report by the
Interagency Task Force on Commodity Markets (2008) that
used confidential CFTC data on investor positions that enable
a more accurate identification of flows originating from
‘speculators’ and other investors than the publicly available
data (IMF (2006) and Haigh, Hranaiova and Overdahl
(2005)).(1)
Cabinet Office (2008), while acknowledging that the impact of
financial investors on futures commodity prices has been
difficult to establish empirically, suggests that ‘in the absence
of large financial flows into and subsequently out of futures
markets, it is possible that futures prices may not have risen
and fallen as much as they did during 2008’.  As supporting
evidence, the authors appeal to the marginal costs of
non-conventional sources of oil supply falling short of futures
prices during the first half of 2008 and the difficulties of
explaining the rise and fall in prices during 2008 by probable
future demand and supply scenarios.
Speculative flows, asset price bubbles and inventories
A number of commentators have pointed out that any
evidence of speculative flows driving oil prices should be
reflected in inventory data (Krugman (2008) and Hamilton
(2009)).  The argument is based on Working’s theory of
storage summarised earlier in the article.  In particular, if
commercial traders interpreted large financial flows into the
futures market as an indicator of future tightness, they would
have an incentive to bring forward spot purchases —
inventories would therefore need to build up.  Equally, an
inventory build-up is necessary for the argument in Caballero
et al (2008) to hold, as speculators shift their demand from
non-storable financial assets to storable oil.
Although data on inventories are not comprehensive, the
available figures do not seem to support the claim that
speculative flows have been driving up oil prices.  OECD
inventories did not increase substantially between late
2006 and 2008 (Chart 15).  And data provided by the Joint
Oil Data Initiative suggest that total inventories in 30
countries for which data are available fell by almost 7% over
this period.(2) This, by itself, convinced some commentators
that speculation could not have been a major driver behind
the rise in oil prices (Krugman (2008)).  Another possibility is
that oil was kept in the ground by producers deliberately
slowing the rate at which oil was extracted.  However, OPEC
spare capacity reached a trough in the first half of 2008,
making it unlikely that they were building up inventories
under the ground.
But as set out in the discussion of Working’s model earlier, the
level of inventories responds to a number of shocks.
Speculative demand for oil as an asset class will tend to lead to
an increase in inventories.  By contrast, a shock to oil demand
that is perceived to be temporary will lead consumers to draw
down their inventory.  It is at least conceivable, therefore, that
observed inventory levels did not rise because the speculative
demand for oil was being offset by physical investors adjusting
their inventories in response to a positive shock to oil demand
that they did not expect to last.  That is, it is possible that
speculative flows could have played a role in driving up oil
prices but it did not show up in the observed inventory data.
Conclusion
This article has examined the potential key factors that have
driven the sharp movements seen in oil prices over the past
few years.  It argues that demand shocks from fast-growing
emerging markets coupled with subsidised prices and
successive overestimation of non-OPEC supply are together
consistent with the continued rise in the oil price between
2003 and 2007.  The behaviour of prices in 2008 is more
difficult to reconcile with news on the balance of demand and
supply.  At the same time, theories that suggest that the rapid
increase in financial flows from speculators in the oil futures
market during recent years led spot prices to diverge from
fundamentals do not find empirical support.  That said, neither
this evidence nor evidence from inventories is sufficient to rule
out completely the possibility that asset price bubble
dynamics might have played a role.
(1) For example, the publicly available NLNC data would exclude flows from oil producers
and consumers that trade in the futures markets for speculative purposes.
(2) The data are from www.jodidata.org.  Their sample includes developing economies,
but omits much of the Middle East and importantly China.  The inventory data that do
exist however do not support the argument that speculative behaviour was a major
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